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The crash of global financial markets in 2008 caused a ripple effect on economic demand and growth worldwide. Export-oriented economies were hit particularly hard, and many governments stepped in quickly with broad-ranging stimulus programs to lessen the effects on households of rising unemployment and falling income. To better understand the role that stimulus policy might play in softening the effects of these shocks, this paper examines recent nationallyrepresentative data from Thailand, an export-dependent economy where a large-scale stimulus program was introduced in 2009. Using monthly data spanning 2006-2010, the paper uses sub-province-level community panel data to examine the effects of major components of the This paper is a product of the Agriculture and Rural Development Team, Development Research Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at skhandker@worldbank.org. stimulus on household consumption, income, borrowing, and debt repaid. To address simultaneity of changes in government spending and household outcomes, the analysis estimates a dynamic panel regression, instrumenting the stimulus effect with second-order lagged outcome variables, and estimating the model using the Generalized Method of Moments. The results suggest that household participation in these programs helped smooth consumption. This increase in monthly consumption was not supported from household receipts from the government stimulus, but more likely through a reallocation of consumption and savings that included greater debt repayment. The paper typically finds stronger effects in urban compared with rural areas.
Introduction
The worldwide economic shock that occurred around 2008, following the near-collapse of the U.S. The World Bank's response has been to call for the establishment of a Vulnerability Fund, which would channel funding into helping countries set up safety-net programs, build infrastructure, support small and medium-sized enterprises, and bolster microcredit. Poor countries with some financial leeway introduced measures such as these and more, but many had limited -fiscal space‖ to expand spending, and often lacked the capacity to respond effectively (Cord et al. 2009 ). Some governments responded through broad-based fiscal stimulus programs to help cushion households and businesses, but owing to the recent nature of the crisis, few studies have been conducted thus far on how households have coped with the crisis and responded to these initiatives.
Export-oriented economies were hit particularly hard by this shock, as foreign and domestic demand slumped and the global credit crunch limited access to trade finance. Thailand is a case in point, with exports making up about 70 percent of GDP. Like China, Thailand was affected by the US recession. GDP fell by 4.2 percent in the last quarter of 2008, and by a further 0.4 percent in the 4 decisionmaking -a study by Corsetti et. al. (2011) using data from the U.S. detects significant spending reversals (falling below trend levels) that follow periods of stimulus in the country's economic history. These spending reversals, likely motivated by an effort to stabilize the country's debt, also affect public expectations profoundly through subsequent cycles. Understanding how exactly government stimulus plays out into different economic sectors, however, hinges on reliable estimates of the multiplier effects of government spending, which can vary considerably across models (Auerbach et. al. 2010 ).
There have been few studies that examine the effects of the 2008 crisis on households in low-and middle-income countries. 1 In the case of East Asia, the most-recent relevant studies have typically looked at the 1997 financial crisis in which the external environment was much more favorable and it was possible to stimulate the crisis-hit economies through sharp increases in net exports. The distributional impacts of that crisis are particularly interesting. Bresciani et al. (2002) , for example, studied the impact of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 on farm households in Thailand and Indonesia; they found that cross-country effects on similar household demographic groups can vary considerably -poor farmers were hard hit in Thailand, but not in Indonesia, and that in both countries farmers specializing in export crops benefited from the currency devaluation associated with that crisis. Friedman and Levinsohn (2002) also find, as in the case of Thailand, that following the crisis in Indonesia, the urban poor were hit the hardest compared to the rural poor, who being able to produce food were able to absorb some of the effects of rapid inflation.
Although the broad issue we are addressing -household responses to shocks and the role that policy might play in softening the effects of these shocks -is of universal importance, our study focuses on just one country, Thailand. This choice is driven not only by its exposure to the 2008 crisis as a heavily export-oriented economy, but also largely by data availability. In this paper, we examine recent quantitative evidence on the household response to the crisis from Thailand using household-level data spanning [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] (that also forms a community-level panel) to examine how well households have been able to smooth consumption amid income fluctuations in the crisis, and also respond to a specific set of fiscal and credit initiatives supported by the government. Data for the Thai Socio-Economic Surveys (SES) are collected on an on-going basis; every month a sample is collected that is large enough to allow one to track the evolution of measures such as income or consumption spending with a considerable degree of precision at the national level.
To address simultaneity of changes in government spending and per capita expenditure, we estimate a dynamic panel regression with the community-level data, instrumenting the stimulus effect with second-order lagged outcome variables, and estimating the model via Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) (Arellano and Bond, 1991 , Jalan and Ravallion 2002 , 1998 .
Thai Macroeconomic Experience in Recent Years
In what follows we briefly summarize the recent macroeconomic experience of Thailand, in order to Changes in world prices of important commodities such as rice, cotton, sugar, and energy (including energy-intensive goods such as fertilizer) were transmitted very quickly to domestic prices.
The average prices of exports and imports both fell sharply after mid-2008, recovering equally quickly in 2009, representing a major mechanism by which the world recession was transmitted to
Thailand.
In the light of such changes, it is perhaps surprising that the value of the baht has changed so little since 2007 (see Figure 3 ). The stability of the real exchange rate meant that changes in the world prices of important commodities such as rice, cotton, sugar, and energy (including energyintensive goods such as fertilizer) were transmitted to domestic prices.
Government Measures to Cope with Economic Shocks
The government responded robustly to the shocks with two rounds of stimulus packages -boosting wage and salary payments to the lowest-paid public employees, raising payments to pensioners, subsidizing utilities for the poor, capping some food prices, lowering interest rates, providing credit guarantees, and spending on temporary jobs. Between the first and second quarters of 2009, government spending rose by 5.6%, and may have prompted the 3.8% rise in consumption spending that occurred then, even while GDP continued to fall (by 0.2%). By July 2009 the number of unemployed had fallen to 480,000.
More specifically, the government responded with a range of fiscal and monetary initiatives to raise consumption and ease the flow of credit to households: 2
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Fiscal measures
(1) In 2008 the government launched a three-pronged program ranging from tax benefits to individuals and businesses, improving access to credit for the poor in rural and urban areas, as well as reducing inflationary pressures on the poor through energy and transport subsidies.
(2) These programs were extended after 2008, and in 2009 the government issued two additional major stimulus measures (called -SP1‖ and -SP2‖) to help ward off growing fears of recession.
Between the first and second quarters of 2009 government spending actually rose by 5.6%.
(3) SP1, launched in March 2009, included a series of welfare measures to improve the situation of the poor, including a tax program to benefit small enterprises and support employment, handouts to poor households and subsidies for housing, education, fuel, water, and transport; additional funding was provided for rural health programs and the universal health plan, and buying back farmlands that had been auctioned off. The overall budget outlay of SP1 was quite large (116.7 billion baht, equivalent to 5.3% of quarterly GDP in the second quarter of 2009) but, as discussed below, since these programs were spread widely across the population, each program under SPI involved a relatively small transfer to a given household (on average 5 percent of monthly household expenditure).
(4) In mid-2009 SP2 was introduced, which focused primarily on a major increase in funding for infrastructure, and working with banks to make access to credit easier for businesses and individuals.
Monetary measures
To help support borrowing, the government relaxed its monetary policy throughout the period, cutting its policy interest rate progressively from 3.5 percent in early 2008 to 1.25 percent by the end of 2009.
Data
In this paper, we focus on the effects of some major components of SP1 on household consumption, income and debt, because this was the first major targeted response to the crisis. Our main interest is in understanding how households responded to these anti-recessionary policies, in anticipation of, as well as after, the policies were introduced and implemented. These questions are particularly relevant in the current economic climate, where the trade-offs of a large-scale government stimulus in a sudden crisis (and hence rising government deficits) are still being debated.
Examining these trends is difficult without intra-year data on fluctuations in household consumption and income, to match with the timing of fiscal and monetary policy interventions.
In the case of Thailand, however, relatively detailed nationally-representative data are available on a monthly basis through the Socioeconomic Survey (SES) conducted by the National Because our participation variable is imputed based on eligibility criteria rather than measured directly -the SES did not ask about participation in these programs -the effects we measure in the analysis are more of an intent to treat rather than an actual impact of participation.
We are therefore examining the potential effect of the stimulus as if everyone who was eligible also In this context, we can examine the coping strategies households adopt in a crisis. Table 2 presents summary data on how households expected to cope during a crisis, and shows that during the first half 2008 they were overwhelmingly inclined to reduce spending and limit their borrowing if 12 economic conditions suddenly worsened. Figure 5 shows that while these tendencies did not vary on a month-to-month basis in early 2008/2009, there are some substantial differences across types of households (urban/rural, and quantiles of per capita expenditure). Households at the highest end of the distribution, for example, were less likely to say they would limit spending and borrowing compared to poorer households, and would be more likely to tap into existing savings during a crisis.
The SES also asked whether households would be ready to seek part-time work in a crisis; there are limited differences across quantiles, but rural households appear more likely to engage in part-time work. Generally, Figure 5 does not show big differences in these patterns between 2008 and 2009.
How do these perceptions translate into actual decision-making on household consumption, income and debt over the period? Table 3 Because of Thailand's dependence on its export market for employment and income for many households in both urban and rural areas, it is likely that a lot of households might have lost jobs even if temporarily during the crisis. Households' income and expenditures therefore depend on their job stability during the crisis. Table 3 shows trends in the share of households with at least one unemployed person aged 15 or above over the period. For urban areas in particular, the crisis that unfolded in late 2008 seems to have generated a short jump in unemployment rates among households in early 2009. In rural areas, however, there is no change in unemployment over the period.
Figures 7a and 7b also examine monthly trends in per capita expenditure by different eligibility groups under the SP1 programs we examine. The graphs reveal some additional patterns not captured by the year-to-year aggregate trends in Table 3 
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Analytical Framework
Changes in monthly income, expenditure, debt, and unemployment across months and years in a given economy reflect the influence of both government and private sectors. In an open economy such as Thailand, other countries also play a role through various ways. Therefore, even if the GDP crunch in early 2009 due to sliding export demand was rapid but short-lived, it is expected that changes in income, expenditure and other outcomes at the household level between the periods before and after the crisis are likely to be influenced by the economic crisis. The quick recovery of GDP demonstrates the resilience of the Thai economy to manage and weather the crisis. What has happened to the welfare of the citizens of Thailand, especially among the poor and those more vulnerable to fluctuations in exports dependent on the outside markets? As we can see in Figures 7a and 7b, some households were hit more than others, with the strongest effects being in the urban areas. This is because coping abilities differ across households and across regions because not all segments of the economy are vulnerable to economic crisis linked to the outside economy.
The government stimulus (call it G) is measured here by the extent of support received by households under the main SP1 programs. We expect that simply by raising the extent of support, the government stimulus can affect household expenditure (c) both directly and indirectly through average monthly income (I), and its monthly share (s), which is measured as income in the month of the interview divided by average income over the previous year, and picks up the effects of seasonality or other shocks. This relationship is represented in the following equation (1):
There are 4 components of changes likely to take place as a consequence of government stimulus:
The first term measures changes in per capita expenditure due to a government stimulus, for a given level of average monthly income. The second term measures the changes in expenditure with a government stimulus, given the distribution of recent monthly share of a household's income. The third term is the changes in per capita expenditure due to induced changes in average monthly income, while the fourth term measures the effect due to induced changes in monthly share of income. We argue that a government stimulus affects both monthly share as well as monthly income and thus is expected to help smooth income and consumption during the crisis and its aftermath. It is not that households did not receive any such support before the crisis, but as Figure 8 shows, the extent of program coverage and its volume (in particular welfare programs) were increased following the crisis due to fiscal measures adopted as part of the government stimulus programs.
Estimating (1) Yet the effects of global economic crisis measured in this way may not be an accurate picture unless we control for the unobserved inherent ability of households and communities to cope with any shock that is independent of the observed coping mechanisms adopted by households, communities, and governments following a crisis. Hence, what we observe in the descriptive and trend analysis is an outcome of the interactions of all observed and unobserved forces. How to disentangle them in terms of the relative strengths of government responses versus household coping strategies is an empirical challenge. What we follow here is a three-step procedure to discern the role of household and government forces in averting the negative consequences of such a global crisis affecting the Thai economy.
The first step involves a structural model of income-consumption smoothing where monthly variations in per capita expenditure are explained by, among other factors, average monthly income and its monthly volatility (the ratio of last month's income, which was recorded in the SES, to average monthly income). 5 We argue that income volatility as observed in the monthly data over time is caused in part by income shocks driven by many factors including global economic crisis. If households manage to smooth consumption even after the crisis, it is possible either because households could withstand consumption and income shocks without government help, or managed to cope with income shocks due to the crisis with help from the government through its stimulus programs. Consequently, the second step involves estimating a reduced-form model where changes in monthly income and consumption are explained by household participation in government stimulus programs.
The second step estimates the total effects of government stimulus programs (i.e., dc/dG in equation 1), the combined effects of all 4 components as laid out in equation (1). In order to understand the extent of the effects of government stimulus independent of households' own ability measured by income and its monthly variability, the third step, therefore, involves estimating the changes in per capita consumption in terms of monthly variations in average household income and its monthly share, conditioned by household participation in government programs. The third step essentially helps estimate the relative roles of household and government in weathering the crisis in terms of monthly fluctuations in income and consumption.
But the main challenge remains, i.e., how to control for the unobserved common time invariant and time varying heterogeneity that affects household income, expenditure, and access to government stimulus programs simultaneously. Note that unobserved heterogeneity can be household-, community-and season-specific. This requires a complicated econometric estimating strategy to estimate the net effects of government stimulus on household ability to withstand the crisis unfolded after 2008 in Thailand. However, both income and expenditure are jointly determined by a set of government policy variables in addition to household and community characteristics. Therefore, the second step involves examining the effects of household participation in fiscal stimulus schemes on per capita expenditure and income. This is to test whether government spending, examined in this paper as the share of households participating in a government stimulus (G), would allow better smoothing of income and consumption:
Model and Estimation Strategy
Here  measures the effect of participation in the stimulus on income and consumption. As noted in equation (1), equations (3a-3c) measure the effects of government interventions on household welfare: it can help the long-or short-run income-earning potential of households, thereby smoothing income and consumption, or it can increase or change the composition of household consumption directly. Other than relying on government support, households may have their own strategies to smooth income and consumption, which may be observed and captured through the effects of socioeconomic variables x.
However, we are also interested in explaining how much variation in monthly consumption, for example, is attributable to household income (independent of government programs) as well as the net effect of household participation in government stimulus. As a third step, therefore we estimate equation (4) below after including participation in the stimulus G directly in equation (2),
given its independent effects as follows.
Estimation strategy
The most difficult issue in estimating the models laid out in equations (2)- (4) is the joint dependence of income and consumption on x as well as the endogeneity of household participation in government programs. In other words, the effects of income and participation in government programs on consumption cannot be isolated unless an appropriate identification strategy is followed. The estimation of independent effects of policy intervention is thus a question of appropriate identification followed in estimation.
In order to understand why identification is an issue and how one can resolve this issue, let us assume that the error term (
 
jm ) has the following implicit structure:
Here j  represents common community heterogeneity, m  represents unobserved common month heterogeneity and jm  is an independent error uncorrelated with any regressors. Thus, estimation of equations (2)- (4) will not yield unbiased estimates because of the underlying error structures given by (5). According to equation (5), the share of households participating in government stimulus programs as well as monthly average income and its volatility plus consumption are all influenced by unobserved community heterogeneity.
At the same time, when we relate monthly consumption to monthly income and its volatility plus some non-income factors, we invariably introduce a common month effect, which affects a household's monthly income, consumption and participation. That is, consumption may be completely independent of monthly variations in income and government policies, and still co-vary with monthly income, simply because of a common month effect (Khandker, 2012) . For example, there is a common monthly but unobserved factor, such as preference of households for certain foods in a specific month -the New Year, for instance -in which case we would get an effect simply because of this common month factor, even though it has nothing to do with monthly variations in income or prices, or participation in government program.
Note that introducing a monthly dummy in the above equations (2)- (4) does not resolve the problem of a common-month effect, because this monthly dummy does not control for the unobserved, location-specific common time effect ( ). Correcting this sort of bias requires monthly household panel data (i.e., repeated observations across months for each household unit), which we do not have. But we have monthly data across households over years across communities. For example, we have community panel data at the sub-Changwat or sub-province level (which as mentioned earlier is the lowest common sampling unit that can help create the panel across months).
Using the community-level panel, we could apply a panel fixed-effects regression, and to control for monthly unobserved bias, we can include month*community interaction variables along with a time trend to control for both j  and
However, a panel fixed-effects model may not suffice to account for time-varying unobserved factors that influence how households respond to stimulus and its associated impacts in the local economy. To account for time-varying unobserved heterogeneity, our approach in this paper is to estimate a dynamic panel model (Arellano and Bond 1991; Jalan and Ravallion, 1998, 2002 ) using the multiple waves of monthly data. As described below, we also account for a range of lagged community characteristics and national prices as additional instruments that would affect access to the stimulus, as well as household outcomes.
Going back to equation (4) 
We assume that the error term includes a community-specific unobserved effect 
However, heterogeneity stemming from the unobserved community-specific effect example, the lagged proportions of households in agriculture, or that are self-employed, renting or owning their property, and the average rent per bedroom in the community, as well as the share of households with internet connections, and who use gas or electricity for cooking. As Thailand's economy is highly integrated with global markets, we also include the world prices of key commodities as instruments that could affect only income or government stimulus programs but not directly the consumption pattern of households. We also argue that changes in the interest rates (repurchase rate) set by the government reflects changes in the stance of monetary policy, which can have an effect on both income and government spending such as stimulus programs. In the estimations, income and program participation are instrumented by using lagged monetary policy decisions (one month lag) on the repurchase rate, as well as lagged world commodity prices (6 month lag) that are likely to affect imports and exports of Thailand's economy. Specifically, the world commodity prices we used were for copper, rubber, maize, and sugar.
Discussion of the Results
Test of consumption smoothing model
Our starting point is to test whether households managed to smooth income and consumption in Thailand over the study period. Table 4 presents the GMM estimates of the effects of monthly income volatility, as well as log average per capita monthly income, on household per capita 7 Jalan and Ravallion (1998) also use lagged levels of the dependent and explanatory variables to instrument for potentially endogenous regressors, as well as initial (first-round) geographic factors.
expenditure (column (1))
. The results clearly demonstrate that monthly income volatility matters a lot in urban areas, but not in rural areas. For example, a 10 percent reduction in last month's income relative to average monthly income reduces per capita monthly consumption by 1.1 percent in urban areas, while the effect is rural areas is not statistically significant. Thus, income volatility had a much more pronounced effect on expenditure in urban areas compared to rural areas.
Are households better able to cope with income volatility due to an economic shock? This is particularly a relevant question to explore further given Thailand's economic contraction following the global economic crisis in late 2008. Did the government stimulus program have an effect on the coping ability of households to smooth income volatility due to an economic crisis? Interestingly, the three stimulus programs we examine under SP1 have a positive and significant effect (albeit small) on per capita expenditure in urban areas -a 10 percent increase in the share of households participating in a community leads to a 0.4 percent increase in monthly per capita expenditure. There is no significant effect in rural areas (column 2). However, there does not appear to be a significant impact of the stimulus on consumption smoothing. Column (4) shows that there is no effect in urban or rural areas on consumption volatility (measured, as we did with income, by the share of last month's consumption expenditure to average monthly expenditure). Controlling for both income variables and participation in the stimulus also does not change the coefficients substantially (column 3), indicating that there is very little feedback from the stimulus to coping ability. This is confirmed in columns (5) and (6), where the stimulus itself has no direct significant impact on income. 8 Table 5 presents a more detailed breakdown of the effects of SP1 on per capita expenditure.
We looked specifically at expenditure on transport and energy, since these were big issues during the crisis in 2008-09 and were also targeted by many of the stimulus' subsidy programs. Table 5 shows that expenditure on petrol for transport declined substantially in both urban and rural areas at the time of the stimulus -perhaps demand for travel fell, or prices came down -and expenditure on public transportation also declined (although the effects for this outcome were not significant), likely as a result of government subsidies that made some bus routes free to users. However, expenditures on electricity rose (again more so in urban than rural areas), indicating that households may have been re-allocating their expenditures across different areas in response to the stimulus. Per capita expenditure on water also rose in urban areas. We revisit this issue of reallocating components of expenditure below, in our discussion of household coping with the crisis.
Throughout the analysis, we present two sets of tests for our dynamic panel results. The first is the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation, which has a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation and is applied to the differenced residuals. The test for AR (1) Hansen overidentification tests (the null being that the instrument set is exogenous). In all of the regressions, we do not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous. The Sargan test is typically used with unclustered standard errors, whereas the Hansen test is used when standard errors are robust or clustered. In all the regressions, we cluster standard errors at the community level.
The role of government stimulus in household coping
The government stimulus has not directly affected average income and its monthly volatility, but yet has a positive effect on per capita expenditure (at least in urban areas). That is, the 3 rd and 4 th terms of equation (1) are essentially zero, while the 1 st and 2 nd term are significant both for rural and urban areas. So even if raising income or its monthly share is not the most direct route, there must be other routes through which SP1 might have helped Thai households smooth their consumption by reducing monthly variations in per capita income. In order to test other possible routes other than income through which government programs help, we also examine at the coping strategies households adopt during an economic crisis other than participation in a government welfare or transfer program. As described earlier, the NSO in Thailand collected information about the strategies households adopted during an economic crisis in its 2008, 2009 and 2010 SES surveys.
The household responses are categorized in two ways: What would they do in an economic crisis, and what do they expect the government to do during the crisis? The responses are presented in Table 2 . We find that the most frequent coping strategy households say they would adopt during an economic crisis was reducing household spending (more than 85 percent of Thai households report they would reduce spending during a crisis). Households might also adopt some other strategies: 9 percent of households say they would tap into savings, and 8 percent report that they would seek (Table 3 ). The loan repayment rate is higher in rural areas than urban areas.
We therefore examine the effects of the stimulus on savings, borrowing, and debt repayment by households in the community as possible coping strategies. Did households draw down on their savings, or change their borrowing patterns to raise or maintain consumption? Table 6 presents the results, again in a dynamic panel framework estimated by GMM. We find a negative but not significant effect of the stimulus on savings in urban areas, as well as a negative effect on borrowing.
We also find that participation in the government stimulus helps increase the probability of debt repayment with the effect being a little more pronounced in urban than rural areas Our analysis therefore suggests that households were using the stimulus money to repay their existing debts, in a direct reallocation of how household funds were being spent.
If the effect on savings is not significant, however, what can explain the significant rise in consumption in urban areas? One possibility is that households experienced greater confidence in the economy as a result of the government stimulus program, and increased their spending as a result. Table 7 examines, in a fixed-effects panel framework, the monthly effects on the share of households in the community that felt the economy was improving (based on the data available in the SES, described in Figure 4 
Lessons Learned: What Matters Most
The crash of global financial markets in 2008 caused a ripple effect on economic demand and growth worldwide. Export-oriented economies were hit particularly hard by this financial crisis-induced demand shock, and governments stepped in quickly with broad-ranging stimulus programs to lessen the negative effects on households from rising unemployment and borrowing costs. To better understand the role that stimulus policy might play in softening the effects of these shocks, we have examined the nationally-representative data from Thailand, an export-dependent economy where a large-scale stimulus program was introduced in 2009. Using monthly data spanning 2006-2010, we use a dynamic lagged dependent model to examine the potential role of government stimulus on household consumption, income, borrowing or debt repaid. To address simultaneity of changes in government spending and household outcomes, we construct a community-level synthetic panel and estimate a dynamic panel regression, instrumenting the stimulus effect with second-order lagged outcome variables, and estimating the model using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).
Our results suggest that household participation in these programs helped smooth consumption directly through higher consumption. But interestingly, this increase in higher monthly consumption was not supported from household receipts from government stimulus, but the income savings that were otherwise used to repay household existing debt. We typically find stronger effects on consumption in urban compared to rural areas. We find a negative but not significant effect on savings in urban areas, which may be another channel through which consumption expenditures increase. Households also seem to have experienced greater confidence in the economy from the stimulus spending, raising expenditures as well.
The Thai government had established an extensive welfare network after the 1997/98
financial crisis caused by currency shock. Such an extensive network was still present during the 2008/2009 crisis, through which the Thai stimulus program was partially implemented. These schemes helped households to receive government support during an economic crisis. We found that household participation in these programs helped not only consumption smoothing directly through higher consumption.
The economic crisis in 2008 that hit Thailand was not so much through financial institutions, unlike the case of the United States and other developed countries. Rather, the crisis manifested itself through job and income cuts due to a sharp drop in export demand, as well as domestic political uncertainty. In this situation, the stimulus in terms of both monetary and fiscal measures that effectively reached the affected households through these safety net measures helped urban households to cope with the fallout of this worldwide crisis. What matters here are that the fiscal measures be appropriately designed and implemented. Thailand managed to avert the most negative consequences of this crisis in part because of its reliance on the national level safety net programs. Notes:
(1) Robust t-statistics in brackets, adjusted for clustering at the community (sub-district) level. Fixed effects are also at the sub-district level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (2) We controlled for a year*month time trend, as well as region*month effects. (3) Regressions also control for a range of socioeconomic variables, including average socioeconomic characteristics of households in the sub-province (of the HH head: age and age squared, gender, religion, marital status, years of schooling; whether any HH member 18 years or older had a chronic illness or disability; household age/gender composition; whether the house was made of solid construction (bricks/cement)).
(4) The Hansen test for overidentification did not reject exogeneity of the instruments for all regressions (p-value close to 1).
(5) Additional instruments in the GMM model include lagged sub-province characteristics (two-month lag) on the share of households in agriculture; share of households that are self-employed; share of renters; share of households owning land; average rent per bedroom; share of households with access to the internet; and share of households using gas or electricity for cooking. We also included some national price variables, including lagged monetary policy decisions (one month lag) on the repurchase rate, as well as lagged world commodity prices (6 month lag) that are likely to affect imports and exports of Thailand's economy. These included the world prices of copper, rubber, corn, and sugar. Notes:
(1) Robust t-statistics in brackets, adjusted for clustering at the community (sub-district) level. Fixed effects are also at the sub-district level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (2) We controlled for a year*month time trend, as well as region*month effects. (5) Regressions also control for a range of socioeconomic variables, average socioeconomic characteristics of households in the sub-province (of the HH head: age and age squared, gender, religion, marital status, years of schooling; whether any HH member 18 years or older had a chronic illness or disability; household age/gender composition; whether the house was made of solid construction (bricks/cement)).
(5) Additional instruments in the GMM model include lagged sub-province characteristics (two-month lag) on the share of households in agriculture; share of households that are selfemployed; share of renters; share of households owning land; average rent per bedroom; share of households with access to the internet; and share of households using gas or electricity for cooking. We also included some national price variables, including lagged monetary policy decisions (one month lag) on the repurchase rate, as well as lagged world commodity prices (6 month lag) that are likely to affect imports and exports of Thailand's economy. These included the world prices of copper, rubber, corn, and sugar. 
Month effects
January 2008 -- [-] [-]
